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Multisensory Spatial Mechanisms of 
the Bodily Self and Social Cognition
A Commentary on Vittorio Gallese & Valentina Cuccio
Christian Pfeiffer
This  commentary aims to find the right description of  the pre-reflective  brain
mechanisms underlying our phenomenal experience of being a subject bound to a
physical body (bodily self) and basic cognitive, perceptual, and subjective aspects
related to interaction with other individuals (social cognition). I will focus on the
proposal by Gallese and Cuccio that embodied simulation, in terms of motor res-
onance, is the primary brain mechanism underlying the pre-reflective aspects of
social cognition and the bodily self. I will argue that this proposal is too narrow
to serve a unified theory of the neurobiological mechanisms of both target phe-
nomena. I support this criticism with theoretical considerations and empirical evid-
ence suggesting that multisensory spatial processing, which is distinct from but a
pre-requisite of motor resonance, substantially contributes to the bodily self and
social cognition.
My commentary is structured in three sections. The first section addresses
social  cognition  and compares  embodied  simulation  to  an alternative  account,
namely the attention schema theory. According to this theory we pre-reflectively
empathize with others by predicting their current state of attention which involves
predicting the spatial focus of attention. Thereby we derive a representational
model of their state of mind. On this account, spatial coding of attention, rather
than motor resonance, is the primary mechanism underlying social cognition. I
take this as a theoretical alternative complementing motor resonance mechanisms.
The second section focuses on the bodily self. Comparison of the brain net-
works of the bodily self and social cognition reveals strong overlap, suggesting
that both phenomena depend on shared multisensory and sensorimotor mechan-
isms. I will review recent empirical data about altered states of the bodily self in
terms of self-location and the first-person perspective. These spatial aspects of
the bodily self are encoded in brain regions distinct from the brain network of em-
bodied simulation. I argue that while motor resonance might contribute to body
ownership and agency, it does not account for spatial aspects of the bodily self.
Thus, embodied simulation appears to be a necessary but insufficiently “primary”
brain mechanism of the bodily self and social cognition. 
The third section discusses the contributions of the vestibular system, i.e.,
the sensory system encoding head motion and gravity, to the bodily self and so-
cial cognition. Vestibular cortical processing seems relevant to both processes, be-
cause it directly encodes the world-centered direction of gravity and allows us to
distinguish between motions of the own body and motions of other individuals and
the external world. Furthermore, the vestibular cortical network largely overlaps
with those neural networks relevant to the bodily self and social cognition. Thus,
the vestibular system may play a crucial role in multisensory spatial coding relat-
ing the bodily self to other individuals in the external world.
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1 Introduction
The paper by Gallese and Cuccio provides an
integrated theoretical framework explaining how
the brain and body relate to social  cognition,
the human self, and language. The authors re-
view  empirical  evidence  from  electrophysiolo-
gical and neuroimaging studies supporting em-
bodied simulation (ES) theory (Gallese & Cuc-
cio this collection, p. 8). According to ES, the
brain covertly simulates the bodily actions, per-
ceptions, and emotions observed in other indi-
viduals by using parts of our neural architecture
involved  in  acting,  sensing,  and  feeling  emo-
tions.  Thereby,  we infer  the  goals,  intentions,
and states of mind of others in a pre-reflective
and  non-conceptual  fashion.  But  the  authors
take this a step further and propose that ES is
the key mechanism underlying, and hence unify-
ing, both social cognition, the human self, and
language.  Throughout  the  paper,  the  authors
emphasize the tight functional coupling between
the body and the brain, which when taken into
account bears the potential to significantly ad-
vance the scientific study of the hard problem of
consciousness (Chalmers 1996). 
This commentary on Gallese and Cuccio
aims to find the right description of the brain
mechanisms underlying pre-reflective aspects of
both the bodily self and social cognition. Spe-
cifically,  I  will  focus  on  Gallese and Cuccio’s
central claim that ES, based on motor reson-
ance and neural processing in the motor system,
is the primary brain mechanism underlying pre-
reflective representations of the bodily self and
social  cognition (Gallese &  Cuccio this collec-
tion, pp. 8–14). I  ask the following questions:
Could there be an alternative theory or empir-
ical evidence countering the claim of a primacy
of motor resonance underlying social cognition
and the bodily self? Which brain mechanisms in
addition to motor resonance might contribute to
pre-reflective aspects of social cognition and the
bodily  self?  I  will  defend  the  following  three
theses:
(1) Social cognition and the bodily self de-
pend  on  multisensory  spatial  coding,
which  is  distinct  from  motor  resonance.
Thus, motor resonance may be a necessary
but insufficiently “primary” brain mechan-
ism of social cognition and the bodily self
(cf. section 1, 2). 
(2) The brain networks underlying social
cognition and the bodily self largely over-
lap.  Specific  functional  associations  exist
(a)  between  motor  resonance  and  body
ownership/agency and (b) between multis-
ensory spatial coding and self-location/the
first-person perspective (cf. section 2).
(3) The vestibular system, i.e., the sensory
system encoding head motion and gravity,
might provide unique information used for
multisensory  spatial  coding  that  relates
the bodily self to other individuals and the
external  world.  This  is  further  suggested
by the large overlap existing between the
human  vestibular  cortex  and  the  brain
networks  underlying  the  bodily  self  and
social cognition (cf. section 3).
My commentary is structured in three sec-
tions. In the first section I shall compare ES to
an alternative theory of social cognition that as-
signs  priority  to  spatial  coding  of  attention,
rather  than to motor resonance.  I  shall  show
that both theories bear the potential that their
proposed brain mechanisms cooperatively work
together  in  order  to  support  social  cognition.
The second section addresses the bodily self. I
shall review data from neurological patients and
full-body illusion experiments,  which highlight
the  importance  of  two  spatial  aspects  of  the
bodily self not mentioned by Gallese and Cuc-
cio,  i.e.,  self-location and the first-person per-
spective. These spatial aspects of the bodily self
depend  primarily  on  multisensory  integration
and on cortical  processing  outside  regions  in-
volved  in  ES.  Furthermore,  comparisons
between the brain networks encoding the bodily
self  and  social  cognition  show  large  overlaps,
suggesting shared functional mechanisms. In the
third section I propose that because multisens-
ory spatial processing appears to be critical for
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the bodily self and social cognition, important
contributions may come from the vestibular sys-
tem (Lenggenhager &  Lopez this collection). I
shall show that the vestibular cortical network
largely overlaps with the brain networks under-
lying the bodily self and social cognition. I shall
discuss potential contributions of vestibular cor-
tical processing to these target phenomena and
suggest directions for future research.
2 Is social cognition based on motor 
resonance or attention tracking?
Social  cognition  refers  to  cognitive  processes,
perceptions, and subjective experiences related
to  interaction  with  conspecifics.  This  section
asks: Which are the brain mechanisms underly-
ing  pre-reflective  aspects  of  social  cognition?
Could there be alternative theories and empir-
ical evidence countering the primary role of mo-
tor resonance?
Gallese and Cuccio  propose  that  social
cognition mainly depends on ES based on motor
resonance and processing of mirror neurons (see
citations  in  Gallese &  Cuccio this collection).
Mirror  neurons  were  initially  discovered  in
fronto-parietal networks of the macaque monkey
brain.  They  are  a  specific  type  of  canonical
neuron involved in planning and executing hand
actions  and  were  found  to  be  activated  both
when the monkey executed a specific grasping
or reaching action and when the monkey pass-
ively observed somebody performing similar ac-
tions (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996).
Neuroimaging  studies  in  humans  also  showed
mirror  neuron-like  activation  patterns  at  the
level of populations of neurons in distinct brain
regions—mainly  the  ventral  premotor  cortex
(vPM), the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), but also
the  insula  cortex  and  the  secondary  somato-
sensory cortex (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010; see
also  figure  1a gray  dots).  ES  proposes  that
based  on  mirror  neurons  the  brain  maps  ob-
served actions into an action space, into motor
potentialities,  within  our  hierarchically-organ-
ized motor system, and thereby infers and pre-
dicts the action goals of the individual. In this
way it penetrates the state of mind of the other,
and thus links self and other in a pre-reflective
empathical fashion (Gallese &  Cuccio this col-
lection, p. 7). 
I would like to point out that motor reson-
ance, i.e., the mapping of observed actions into
motor  potentialities,  necessarily  depends  on
multisensory spatial coding. I argue that this is
the case because of five points: First, the brain
has access to the physical world only through
the different sensory receptors of the body that
bombard it with exteroceptive (e.g., vision, au-
dition), proprioceptive (somatosensory, vestibu-
lar), and interoceptive (somatosensory, visceral)
signals. Second, these multisensory signals must
be  integrated  according  to  their  spatial  and
temporal parameters (Stein & Stanford 2008) to
inform neural  representations  of  the  states  of
the body and of the world around us—including
the agents whose actions are subject to motor
resonance.  Third,  the  observed  movements  of
these agents are coded in coordinates  distinct
from the egocentric  spatial  frame of  reference
upon which our motor system operates. Fourth,
the  brain  must  necessarily  perform  spatial
transformations of the observed movements by
the other agent into the egocentric frame of ref-
erence, upon which motor resonance can oper-
ate.  In  sum,  multisensory  spatial  coding  is  a
pre-requisite of motor resonance.
According to Gallese and Cuccio, the out-
comes of  such multisensory spatial  coding are
readily  available  to  the  brain  network  of  ES
through  anatomical  connections  to  the  vPM
that are “anatomically connected to visual and
somatosensory  areas  in  the  posterior  parietal
cortex and to frontal motor areas” (Gallese &
Cuccio this collection, p. 10). However, it seems
that  the  multisensory  spatial  coding  required
for a precise description of complex motor acts
might be computationally costly. Might there be
a computationally more effective alternative by
which multisensory spatial coding is used to de-
code the intentions of observed agents?
The  attention  schema  (AS)  theory  of
awareness (Graziano 2013; Graziano & Kastner
2011) proposes that brain mechanisms related
to attention and spatial coding, which are dis-
tinct  from  neural  processing  relevant  to  ES,
primarily underlie pre-reflective aspects of social
cognition.  Graziano and Kastner define  atten-
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tion as an information-handling mechanism of
the brain that serves to give priority to some in-
formation (e.g., representational features) out of
several equally probable alternatives that are in
constant  competition  for  awareness.  Further-
more,  awareness is  defined  as  the  process  of
consciously  experiencing  something,  it  is  the
process of relating the subject (i.e., a phenom-
enal self,  see also  Metzinger 2003) to the ob-
ject/content of experience. Graziano and Kast-
ner summarize AS as follows:
[Awareness  is  information  and]  depends
on some system in the brain that must
have computed [it] […]; otherwise, the in-
formation  would  be  unavailable  for  re-
port.  […]  People  routinely  compute  the
state of awareness of other people [and]
the  awareness  we  attribute  to  another
person is our reconstruction of that per-
son’s attention. […] The same machinery
that computes socially relevant informa-
tion  […]  also  computes  […]  information
about our own awareness. […] Awareness
is […] a perceptual model […] a rich in-
formational  model  that includes,  among
other  computed  properties,  a  spatial
structure. […] Through the use of the so-
cial perceptual machinery, we assign the
property  of  awareness  to  a  location
within  ourselves.  (Graziano &  Kastner
2011, pp. 98–99)
Related to social cognition, AS proposes that by
using a schematic representation of the state of
attention of other individuals—including a pre-
diction of the spatial location of their focus of
attention—we  predict  the  current  state  of
awareness of the individual, which is informat-
ive about their intentions and potential future
actions. In short: Awareness of others is an at-
tention schema. As compared to ES, AS is a rel-
atively recent theory that requires extensive em-
pirical  studies.  Yet  the evidence  so  far  shows
that indeed the brain has a neural circuitry for
monitoring  the  spatial  configuration  of  one’s
own attention independent of the sensory mod-
ality (Downar et al. 2000), including the direc-
tion of gaze (Beck & Kastner 2009; Desimone &
Duncan 1995). These  structures  are  the  pro-
posed neural expert system upon which AS is
based and consist of the right-hemispheric tem-
poro-parietal junction (TPJ) and superior tem-
poral sulcus (STS) (see figure 1a in black). Not-
ably, this expert system relevant to AS shows
little anatomical overlap with the neural struc-
tures relevant to ES (figure  1a compare black
with gray).
Because  the AS relies  on coding of  the
spatial  relationship  between  the  location  of
the observed individual and the likely spatial
location of this individual’s attention (i.e., in-
dependent  of  a  particular  sensory modality),
the required spatial computations seem simple
and straightforward. They require two points,
i.e.,  the  individual  as  a  reference  point  and
the potential spatial location of the attention
of  that  individual.  According  to  AS,  using
such spatial labeling the brain is able to sim-
ultaneously  track  the  aware  and  attending
minds  of  several  individuals  simultaneously.
Thus, spatial coding in the context of AS ap-
pears  to  be  less  complex  and  less  computa-
tionally  demanding  than  spatial  transforma-
tions underlying ES (see above). 
Which of  these seemingly distinct brain
mechanisms  proposed  by  AS  and  ES  more
plausibly underlies social cognition: the neural
expert system decoding the state of attention
according to AS or the mirror mechanism sys-
tem decoding observed motor plans according
to ES? It has been proposed that AS and ES
may in principle work together. Graziano and
Kastner propose that the expert system of AS
may take a leading role by formulating a hy-
pothesis about the state of awareness of an in-
dividual that is  likely to drive further  beha-
vior and therefore provide a set of predictions
based upon which motor resonance could more
efficiently  perform  simulations  (Graziano &
Kastner 2011).  Motor  resonance  would  thus
add richer detail to the state-of-attention hy-
pothesis made by the expert system.
This combined mechanism is compatible
with the predictive processing principle (Clark
this collection;  Hohwy 2013,  this collection),
which has been proposed relevant to the bod-
ily self (Apps & Tsakiris 2013; Limanowski &
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Blankenburg 2013;  Seth this collection).  Ac-
cording to predictive processing the brain con-
stantly predicts  the potential  causes  of  sens-
ory input by minimizing prediction errors via
update  of  the  predicted  causes  or  by  action
that  changes  sensory  input  (Friston 2005).
Applying the predictive processing principle to
Graziano and Kastner’s proposal that AS is a
hypothesis-generating  tool  to  which ES adds
further  detail,  one  could  conceive  of  both
mechanisms as different predictive processing
modules  aimed  at  anticipating  the  state  of
awareness and of intentional actions observed
in others. Although no empirical study so far
has  addressed  this  specific  hypothesis,  a  re-
cent  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging
study  found  that  predictive  processing  prin-
ciples accounted for the blood oxygen-level de-
pendent activity related to the perception of
faces, which is an important perceptual func-
tion for social cognition in the human species
(Apps & Tsakiris 2013).
These  common  and  distinct  predictions
based  on  ES,  AS,  and  predictive  processing
call for empirical research aimed at providing
evidence to further refine, integrate, or reject
them.
3 Multisensory and motor mechanisms of
the multifaceted bodily self
The bodily self refers to the phenomenal experi-
ence  of  being  an  experiencing  subject  (i.e.,  a
phenomenal  self)  bound  to  a  physical  body,
which gives rise to the dual nature of the body
(Husserl 1950; Gallese & Cuccio this collection,
p. 2). The unified experience of being a bodily
self  can be decomposed into different aspects,
including the experience that we identify with a
particular body (self-identification or body own-
ership), the experience that the self is situated
in a specific spatial location (self-location), that
we take a specific experiential perspective at the
world (first-person perspective), and that we are
the  authors  of  our  actions,  including  having
control  of  attentional  focus  (agency;  (Blanke
2012; Ehrsson 2012; Jeannerod 2003; Metzinger
2003). 
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Figure 1: Summary of cortical brain regions involved in social cognition, the bodily self, and vestibular processing. (a)
Whereas for social cognition there is little overlap between the brain regions proposed relevant for the attention schema
(in black) and embodied simulation (in gray), both sets of brain regions overlap with (b) the brain network of the bod-
ily self as identified by full-body illusion experiments manipulating self-location and first-person perspective (in black)
and the body-swap illusion manipulating mainly body ownership (in gray). (c) The human vestibular cortical regions
(in black) are widely distributed and overlap with several regions relevant to both the bodily self and social cognition.
(The images are derived from images by NASA, licensed under creative commons.)
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In their paper, Gallese & Cuccio highlight
the relevance of mirror mechanisms, in particu-
lar related to processing in the cortical motor
system, to the sense of body ownership and the
sense of agency, in particular in the context of
action and action observation:
This  minimal  notion  of  the  self,  namely
the bodily self as power-for-action […], ta-
citly presupposes ownership of an action-
capable agentive entity; hence, it primarily
rests upon the functionality of the motor
system. (this collection, p. 10) 
However, recent philosophy of mind and cognit-
ive neuroscience research reveals the crucial role
of spatial aspects of the bodily self, consisting of
a  first-person  perspective  and self-location.  In
this section I shall compare the brain network
contributing to spatial aspects of the bodily self
with the brain network underlying body owner-
ship  and  ask:  Do  these  neuroimaging  results
support the proposal that motor resonance is a
primary  mechanism  underlying  all  aspects  of
the  bodily  self?  What  is  the  relationship
between the neural networks of the bodily self
and social cognition? Which functional associ-
ations can be derived from this?
3.1 Brain mechanisms of spatial aspects 
of the bodily self
The phenomenal experience of being a subject
is associated with a spatial location, which typ-
ically is the space of the physical body (see also
Alsmith &  Longo 2014;  Limanowski &  Hecht
2011).  However,  there  are exceptions  to these
prototypical states of the bodily self in neurolo-
gical disorders and experimental illusions point-
ing to a specific set of brain regions involved in
spatially  linking  the  phenomenal  self  to  the
physical body. 
Which brain mechanisms link the phenom-
enal self to the physical body to give rise to the
dual nature of the body as lived body and as
physical  object?  Research  in  neurological  pa-
tients  who  have  had  out-of-body  experiences
(OBE) shows that damage or interference with
the right TPJ can lead to dissociations between
the bodily self and physical body (Blanke et al.
2004; Blanke et al. 2002; De Ridder et al. 2007;
Ionta et  al. 2011).  During  an  OBE,  patients
typically experience a disembodied self-location
in elevation above their physical body, and an
altered  first-person  perspective  that  originates
from an elevated location in the room and is
directed  downwards  at  the  physical  body
(Blanke et al. 2004; Metzinger 2009). These pa-
tients do not identify with their physical body
but with an illusory double outside of the bor-
ders of the physical body. At the phenomenolo-
gical level, self-location and the first-person per-
spective are often experienced as having their
spatial  origin  in  the  same  position.  However,
during OBE there are instances where self-loca-
tion  can  be  dissociated  from  the  first-person
perspective in different sensory modalities (De
Ridder et al. 2007). Further evidence from aso-
matic OBEs and bodiless dreams suggests that
a phenomenal  first-person perspective may be
reducible  to  a  single  point  in  space  (Windt
2010). In fact, vestibular hallucinations system-
atically preceded OBEs in patients  with sleep
paralysis,  i.e.,  a  motor  paralysis  characterised
by the transient inability to execute bodily ac-
tions  when waking  up from sleep  (Cheyne &
Girard 2009),  showing further  dissociations  of
the spatial location of the bodily self and the
physical body and links to sensory processing.
These studies seem to suggest that the first-per-
son perspective and self-location may depend on
different neural mechanisms (Blanke 2012).
OBE in epileptic patients can be induced
by subcortical electrical stimulation of a specific
intensity at the TPJ. However, stimulating the
same brain region with either lower or higher
stimulation intensity induces bodily sensations
(including  vestibular,  visual,  somatosensory,
kinesthetic  sensations)  without  inducing  an
OBE (Blanke et al. 2002). These observations
gave rise to the idea that the spatial aspects of
the bodily self are based on the accurate integ-
ration of  multisensory signals  (i.e.,  which was
perturbed by electrical  stimulation in  the  pa-
tient in  Blanke et al. 2002, which are sensory
signals  from personal  space to sensory signals
from  the  external  environment  Blanke et  al.
2004).
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These  clinical  observations  in  patients
were corroborated by different full-body illusion
experiments in healthy subjects, such as the so-
called “body-swap illusion” (Petkova & Ehrsson
2008;  Petkova et al. 2011;  van der Hoort et al.
2011), the “full-body illusion” (Ionta et al. 2011;
Lenggenhager et al. 2009;  Lenggenhager 2007;
Pfeiffer et al. 2013; Pfeiffer, Schmutz & Blanke
2014), and the “out-of-body illusion” (Ehrsson
2007; Guterstam & Ehrsson 2012). In these ex-
periments,  healthy  subjects  receive  conflicting
signals about the spatial location of their body
and of the temporal synchrony of exteroceptive
and  interoceptive  signals,  including  somato-
sensory, cardiac, and vestibular signals that at
the same time are applied to a virtual or fake
body seen by the subject (Aspell et al. 2013;
Ionta et al. 2011; Pfeiffer et al. 2013; Pfeiffer et
al. 2014). For example, in the full-body illusion,
synchronous stroking of a virtual or fake body
seen from a distance can induce the feeling in
participants that they are more closely located
to the position of the virtual or fake body, and
that they experience and increase of ownership
for the seen body. The brain regions involved in
these spatial experimental manipulations of the
experienced bodily self most consistently involve
the right TPJ region, but also draw on somato-
sensory and visual regions that process the sens-
ory inputs (Blanke 2012;  Ionta et al. 2011; fig-
ure 1b in black). Recently, several studies have
manipulated visual and vestibular signals about
the  direction  of  gravity,  affecting  self-location
and  perspective  and  thus  showing  that  those
visual spatial cues affect our subjective experi-
ence of the first-person perspective (Ionta et al.
2011; Pfeiffer et al. 2013). These authors presen-
ted  images  on  virtual-reality  goggles  showing
visual gravitational cues,  similar to the visual
perspective  during  an  OBE  showing  a  scene
from an elevated spatial location and a visual
viewpoint  directed  downwards  into  the  room.
At the same time the somatosensory and the
vestibular  signals  received  by  the  participant,
who was lying on the back, suggested that the
physical  body  was  oriented  upwards  with  re-
spect to veridical gravity. Thus the visual grav-
ity  cues  (i.e.,  downwards)  and  the  vestibular
gravity cues (i.e., upwards) were in directional
conflict.  When  the  full-body  illusion  was  in-
duced under these conflicting conditions, parti-
cipants reported subjective changes in their ex-
perienced direction of the first-person perspect-
ive (upward or downward) in line with experi-
mentally-induced multisensory conflict (Ionta et
al. 2011; Pfeiffer et al. 2013).
3.2 Brain mechanisms of body ownership
A different brain network encodes experimental
manipulations of another aspect of the bodily
self:  body ownership.  This  was  shown by the
body-swap  illusion (Petkova &  Ehrsson 2008;
Petkova et  al. 2011),  during  which  the  parti-
cipant  views  from  a  first-person  visual  view-
point the body of a mannequin or another per-
son. Thus no conflict between the visual spatial
coordinates  of  the  participant’s  physical  body
and the visually-perceived location of the man-
nequin is presented. However, conflicting sens-
ory information about the shape, gender, size,
or overall spatial context surrounding the vir-
tual body were presented that typically preven-
ted feeling ownership of the virtual body. If un-
der  these  conditions  visuo-tactile  stroking  on
the abdomen of the participant and the virtual
body was synchronously administered, an illu-
sion of ownership for the body emerged, reflec-
ted  in  increased  responses  to  threatening  the
mannequin.  In different  variants  of  the body-
swap illusion subjects reported experiencing and
adopting different sizes of both the virtual body
and  the  contextual  environment  (Petkova &
Ehrsson 2008;  Petkova et  al. 2011;  van  der
Hoort et al. 2011). Neuroimaging experiments of
the body-swap illusion show activation of  the
vPM  and  IPS  regions,  notably  without  in-
volving actions made by subjects or performed
by the virtual body (Petkova et al. 2011). These
brain regions are key nodes of the mirror mech-
anism network of ES (see  Serino et al. 2013).
For a recent review see figure 1b.
3.3 A shared brain network of bodily self 
and social cognition
Although the neuroimaging evidence so far sug-
gests that distinct brain regions encode the spa-
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tial aspects of the bodily self and body owner-
ship (Blanke 2012;  Serino et al. 2013), the en-
semble  of  those  bodily  self-encoding  regions
closely  matches  the  brain  regions  relevant  for
social cognition (compare in figure 1a with fig-
ure  1b).  These  empirical  data  indeed  suggest
that the bodily self and social cognition are en-
coded  by  at  least  overlapping  neural  circuits
supporting the proposal of ES that neural capa-
cities to control and monitor the own body are
used in understanding others.
These neuroimaging data suggest particu-
lar functional associations between different as-
pects of social cognition and the bodily self. In
particular, the brain network of ES anatomic-
ally overlaps with regions encoding experiment-
ally-induced changes in body ownership during
the  body-swap  illusion  (figure  1a‒b in  gray),
which involves spatial congruence of the obser-
vational  viewpoint  and  position  of  the  fake
body and the participant’s body. A second asso-
ciation can be observed between the brain net-
work of AS and the brain regions encoding spa-
tial aspects of the bodily self,  as manipulated
during  the  full-body  illusion  (figure  1a‒b in
black). During the latter, the position and ob-
servational viewpoints of the virtual body and
the  participant’s  body  are  in  spatial  conflict,
and thus closely resemble social interaction set-
tings.
Based on these functional and neuroana-
tomical observations, I propose that ES seems
to contribute to the bodily self and social cogni-
tion in a way primarily related to the sense of
body ownership and agency. However, ES does
not account for multisensory spatial representa-
tions that relate the physical body to the bodily
self in space. These spatial aspects of the bodily
self are encoded by brain regions outside of the
brain network of ES, and rather resemble those
brain  regions  relevant  for  coding  the  spatial
configuration of attention (or awareness, accord-
ing to AS).
Because two crucial aspects of the bodily
self, i.e., self-location and the first-person per-
spective,  are encoded in the TPJ region,  and
full-body illusions show that they can be ma-
nipulated  without  action  or  motor  manipula-
tions, it seems implausible that ES as based on
motor resonance is the primary brain mechan-
ism  underlying  the  bodily  self.  Instead,  the
brain  networks  coding  self-location  and  the
first-person  perspective,  which  overlap  with
brain regions proposed to encode spatial aspects
of an attention schema (see figure  1), seem to
contribute to at least an equal degree to both
the bodily self  and social cognition. Thus, ES
seems  to  be  a  necessary  but  insufficiently
“primary” brain mechanism underlying the bod-
ily self and social cognition.
I do not mean to imply that these are in-
dependent processes, because it is possible that
they cooperatively work together (Graziano &
Kastner 2011).  However,  I  think  that  Gallese
and Cuccio’s claim of a primacy of motor reson-
ance underlying the multifaceted aspects of the
bodily self and social cognition is questionable
on empirical and theoretical grounds.
4 Vestibular contributions to the bodily 
self and social cognition
In the previous sections I have provided theoret-
ical  considerations  and  empirical  evidence  as-
signing  a  critical  role  to  multisensory  spatial
processing in the neural computations underly-
ing representations of the bodily self and social
cognition. This section will further examine the
multisensory mechanisms relating the space of
the bodily self to other individuals and the ex-
ternal world. I propose that important contribu-
tions to the brain’s multisensory spatial coding
might come from a particular sensory system,
i.e., the vestibular system, which has often been
neglected in studies of higher brain functions re-
lated to subjectivity and intersubjectivity. I will
ask: What might be the functional contribution
of the vestibular system to pre-reflective repres-
entations of the bodily self and social cognition?
How does the human vestibular cortex relate to
the neural networks of the bodily self and social
cognition?
The  vestibular system consists of sensory
organs in the inner ear that sense accelerations
of the head in space, including rotational and
linear movement of the head and whole body
and  the  constant  acceleration  of  gravity  on
earth (Day & Fitzpatrick 2005). Vestibular sig-
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nals  are processed by subcortical  and cortical
structures  (Angelaki &  Cullen 2008;  Cullen
2012;  Lopez & Blanke 2011). Research initially
focused on subcortical processing as related to
gaze control, postural stabilization, and neural
computations  of  head  motion  directions
(Fernandez &  Goldberg 1971;  Goldberg &
Fernandez 1971). More recently, studies have re-
vealed  the  contribution  of  vestibular  cortical
processing  to  spatial  cognition,  body  percep-
tion, and the bodily self (see  Lenggenhager &
Lopez this collection;  Lopez &  Blanke 2011;
Pfeiffer et al. 2014 for reviews). These studies
show that vestibular cortical processing is based
on a neural network of distinct, distributed, and
multisensory  cortical  regions.  In  distinction
from any other  sensory  modality,  there  is  no
primary vestibular cortex that processes purely
vestibular signals. Instead, a core vestibular cor-
tical  input  region,  the  human  parieto-insular
vestibular cortex (PIVC;  Lopez et al. 2012;  zu
Eulenburg et al. 2012), processes vestibular, so-
matosensory, and visual signals and is connec-
ted to a number of multisensory brain regions in
the parietal, temporal, cingulate, and frontal re-
gions (figure 1c).
The vestibular system contributes to spa-
tial  aspects  of  the  bodily  self.  For  instance,
OBEs were associated with vestibular sensation,
such as floating in elevation (Blanke et al. 2004;
Blanke & Mohr 2005;  Blanke et al. 2002), and
vestibular sensations preceded OBEs in persons
with sleep paralysis  (Cheyne &  Girard 2009).
Other studies  presented conflicting  visual  and
vestibular  signals  about  earth  gravity  during
the  full-body  illusion  and  induced  changes  in
the subjectively-experienced spatial direction of
the  first-person  perspective  and  self-location
(Ionta et al. 2011; Pfeiffer et al. 2013). Thus, it
has  been  argued  that  vestibular  cortical  pro-
cessing does not merely signal the motions of
the own body and the external  world,  but  is
also constitutive of spatial aspects of the bodily
self (Lopez et al. 2008; Pfeiffer et al. 2014).
Previously, Lopez et al. (2013), Deroualle
&  Lopez (2014),  and  Lenggenhager &  Lopez
(this collection) have argued that the vestibu-
lar system probably contributes to social cog-
nition. I will briefly summarize their main ar-
guments  and  complement  them  with  own
points:
First, because the human species evolved
under the steady influence of the earth’s gravit-
ational field, adaptation to gravity also framed
and affected action, perception, and social inter-
action. More recently, research has shown that
the brain hosts internal models of gravity, rep-
resenting the effects of gravity on the motion of
objects under the influence of gravity, of self-
motion, of bodily actions, and of the direction
of the gravitational acceleration. Those internal
models of gravity strongly overlap with the ves-
tibular cortex (Indovina et al. 2005; Indovina et
al. 2013;  McIntyre et  al. 2001;  Sciutti et  al.
2012). More evidence for a vestibular contribu-
tion  to  social  perception  comes  from  studies
showing the effects  of  gravitational  signals  on
the  perception  of  emotional  faces  (Thompson
1980) and the perception of the spatial orienta-
tion of bodies (Lopez et al. 2009).
Second, the vestibular system might con-
tribute  to  social  cognition  because  it  detects
head motions in space and hence directly en-
ables us, when compared to other sensory sig-
nals,  to discern movements made by our own
body from motions of other individuals and mo-
tions of the external environment (Deroualle &
Lopez 2014). 
Third,  mental  spatial  transformation  of
the own visual viewpoint to that of another per-
son presents an important underlying cognitive
aspect  of  social  cognition  (Furlanetto 2013;
Hamilton 2009;  Newen &  Vogeley 2003;  also
cited by Gallese & Cuccio this collection, pp. 9–
11). More direct evidence supporting this hypo-
thesis comes from a recent study that showed
that physical whole-body rotations, which stim-
ulate the vestibular sensory organs, affected the
ability of participants to perform mental spatial
transformations (van Elk & Blanke 2013).
Fourth, I have argued in previous sections
of  this  commentary  that  multisensory  spatial
coding  is  a  critical  prerequisite  that  underlies
pre-reflective  brain  mechanisms  of  the  bodily
self and social cognition. Because the vestibular
cortical processing has been strongly associated
with  multisensory  integration  (for  review  see
Lopez & Blanke 2011), it is likely that vestibu-
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lar signals shape multisensory spatial coding rel-
evant  to  the  bodily  self  and  social  cognition
(Deroualle & Lopez 2014; Pfeiffer et al. 2014).
Fifth,  the  distributed  multisensory  vesti-
bular cortical network clearly overlaps with the
neural  structures  involved  in  social  cognition
and the bodily self, which suggests that there is
a functional contribution on the part of vestibu-
lar processing to these phenomena (compare fig-
ure 1c to 1a and 1b; compare also to Deroualle
& Lopez 2014). 
Together,  these  five  points  suggest  that
the vestibular system may be a promising can-
didate  for  future  studies  of  the  sensorimotor
mechanisms  of  social  cognition,  which  should
motivate research on the intersection of vestibu-
lar cortical processing, mirror mechanisms, and
intersubjectivity.  These  studies  may,  for  in-
stance, question how vestibular stimulation af-
fects our ability to reconstruct the process of at-
tention of another person, a function critical in
the AS framework. Although the vestibular sys-
tem is related to reflexive motor control, it is
not  clear  whether  it  also  affects  motor reson-
ance (see Deroualle & Lopez 2014 for a related
proposal).  One  might  ask  whether  vestibular
processing  facilitates  or  inhibits  motor  reson-
ance and our understanding of  intentional ac-
tion observed in others. How about vestibular
contributions to theory of mind and reasoning?
On the other hand, does social interaction mod-
ulate  vestibular  functions,  such  as  self-motion
perception, postural stabilization, and gaze con-
trol? These questions address the role of vesti-
bular processing in functional mechanisms relev-
ant to the AS and ES frameworks. Furthermore,
empirical  research  addressing  the  causal  rela-
tionship between the AS and ES brain mechan-
isms and the bodily self and social cognition are
needed, for instance by brain lesion analysis or
direct brain stimulation.
5 Conclusion
At the beginning of this paper I asked which
brain mechanisms underlie pre-reflective repres-
entations of the bodily self and social cognition.
ES,  based  on  motor  resonance,  substantially
contributes to the representation of the bodily
self and social cognition. However, a unified the-
ory of the neural basis of these target phenom-
ena cannot assign a primary role to motor res-
onance. I have argued that multisensory spatial
coding is at least of equal importance and prob-
ably more basic than ES in contributing to sev-
eral  key aspects  of  the  bodily  self  and social
cognition. 
Specifically, I have argued that:
(1) Social cognition and the bodily self de-
pend  on  multisensory  spatial  coding,
which  is  distinct  from  motor  resonance.
Thus, motor resonance may be a necessary
but insufficiently “primary” brain mechan-
ism of social cognition and the bodily self
(cf. section 1, 2). 
(2) The brain networks underlying social
cognition and the bodily self largely over-
lap.  Specific  functional  associations  exist
(a)  between  motor  resonance  and  body
ownership/agency and (b) between multis-
ensory spatial coding and self-location/the
first-person perspective (cf. section 2).
(3) The vestibular system, i.e., the sensory
system encoding head motion and gravity,
might provide unique information used for
multisensory  spatial  coding  that  relates
the bodily self to other individuals and the
external  world.  This  is  further  suggested
by the large overlap existing between the
human  vestibular  cortex  and  the  brain
networks  underlying  the  bodily  self  and
social cognition (cf. section 3).
A unifying  theory  of  pre-reflective  brain
mechanisms of the bodily self and social cogni-
tion must be able to account for the empirical
evidence reviewed here; and it seems that such
a theory  cannot  exclusively  depend on motor
resonance.  Multisensory  spatial  coding,  motor
mechanisms, but also representations of the pro-
cess of attention appear highly relevant to bod-
ily self and social cognition.
I agree with Gallese & Cuccio (this collec-
tion, pp. 3–7) that cognitive neuroscience can-
not fully explore these exciting topics by limit-
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ing  itself  to  a  specific  neuroimaging  method,
such as functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Instead,  we  should  exploit  multi-method  ap-
proaches  in  search  for  correlative  and  causal
evidence relating brain function and anatomy to
the phenomenology of the bodily self and social
cognition. The body, but also the spatial repres-
entation of the world around us, are relevant to
understanding brain function, and when taken
into  account  can lead  to  novel  approaches  to
phenomenal  analysis  of  subjective  experience.
But we should be careful in assigning priority to
a single brain mechanism when aiming to ex-
plain the human self and intersubjectivity. Scru-
tiny and dialogue at the intersection of philo-
sophy of  mind and cognitive neuroscience  are
necessary in order to advance our understanding
of the nature of the human mind. 
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